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Note 
Embracing Equity: A New Remedy for Wrongful 
Health Insurance Denials 
E. Daniel Robinson∗ 
Carmine Cicio was diagnosed with blood cancer in March 
1997.1 His doctor tried chemotherapy first, but then decided 
that a blood stem cell transplant was the most appropriate 
treatment.2 The procedure was well-established, with better re-
sponse rates than other treatments, and Mr. Cicio was a good 
candidate.3 However, the doctor needed the approval of Mr. 
Cicio’s insurer before beginning the treatment.4 Although the 
insurer’s medical director had never seen Mr. Cicio, he never-
theless determined the stem cell transplant was not a suitable 
treatment for him.5 Mr. Cicio’s doctor spent months trying to 
convince the insurance company to reverse its decision.6 Fi-
nally, the medical director relented and admitted that the 
treatment was right for Mr. Cicio.7 By then, however, it was too 
late. Mr. Cicio died in May 1998.8 
Mr. Cicio’s wife sued the insurance company and its medi-
cal director for multiple claims, including medical malpractice.9 
The insurance company argued Ms. Cicio’s claims were pre-
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1992, 
Rice University. The author wishes to thank the following people whose advice 
and commentary helped shape this Note: Shaw Scott, David Leishman, 
Stephen Befort, and Kate McKinnon. The author is especially grateful to his 
wife Kelli for her selfless patience and generous support, without which this 
Note would have been impossible. Copyright © 2006 by E. Daniel Robinson. 
 1. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Vy-
tra Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (mem.). 
 2. Id. at 87–88. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 88. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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empted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA),10 which governs the administration of employee 
benefit plans and provides remedies for violations.11 The U.S. 
Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the insurer and re-
manded Ms. Cicio’s claims for reconsideration.12 
The Court reached this result after holding in Aetna Health 
Inc. v. Davila13 that claims against ERISA health insurers for 
denial of benefits are preempted by ERISA, which has its own 
“comprehensive remedial scheme.”14 So why is it that Ms. Cicio, 
like the plaintiffs in Davila, did not amend her complaint to 
take advantage of these ERISA remedies? It turns out that 
courts and commentators—and plaintiffs’ lawyers—are nearly 
unanimous in declaring there is no remedy for plaintiffs like 
Ms. Cicio after Davila. As explained in Part I.C, this common 
view holds that patients harmed by wrongful denials of health 
insurance simply have no way of pursuing compensation for 
their losses. Most commentators conclude that this situation 
will continue until the Court overturns its precedents or Con-
gress amends ERISA. 
However, such patients may not need to look to Congress 
for a solution. The Supreme Court will still allow relief under 
ERISA if both the basis for the claim and the category of rem-
edy were historically available in equity. Because of these de-
manding requirements, the Court will likely reject most pro-
posed remedies for providing compensation under ERISA, such 
as restitution, reinstatement, and make-whole relief for breach 
of fiduciary duty. 
Plaintiffs may find acceptable ERISA remedies, though, by 
embracing the Court’s command to examine the practice of his-
torical courts of equity. Surcharge is a remedy historically 
granted by courts of equity for breaches of fiduciary duty.15 It 
requires the fiduciary to compensate the victim for costs in-
curred, income lost, and gains foregone because of the breach.16 
 
 10. See id. at 89. 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000). 
 12. Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (mem.). 
 13. 542 U.S. 200 (2004). 
 14. Id. at 217. 
 15. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means By ‘Equitable’: The Su-
preme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1317, 1352 (2003). 
 16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205, cmt. a (1992); see id. §§ 210, 
211; see also F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 
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This Note argues that surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty 
fulfills the Court’s requirements for “equitable relief” under 
ERISA and meets the objections the Court has raised to other 
forms of compensatory relief.17 
Part I of this Note describes ERISA remedies and the Su-
preme Court decisions that have constrained those remedies. 
Part II argues that the Court has defined a two-part test for 
equitable relief under ERISA and proposes that surcharge for 
breach of fiduciary duty satisfies the Court’s test for equitable 
relief, while other alternatives for providing monetary make-
whole relief under ERISA do not. This Note concludes that sur-
charge for breach of fiduciary duty may provide a last chance at 
compensation for victims of wrongful healthcare denials. 
I.  THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: LIMITED ERISA 
REMEDIES PLUS TOTAL ERISA PREEMPTION  
CREATE A REGULATORY VACUUM 
ERISA provides three main remedies for employees with 
complaints about their employer-provided benefits.18 Of these, 
the remedy offering equitable relief for beneficiaries provides 
the greatest potential for relief to victims of wrongful health in-
surance denials.19 However, the Court has narrowly construed 
equitable relief to exclude most, if not all consequential dam-
ages.20 Moreover, patients cannot sue under common law or 
state law causes of action because the Court has ruled that  
ERISA preempts such claims.21 As a result, a “regulatory vac-
 
1128, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 17. The idea of surcharge as an ERISA remedy derives from Professor 
Langbein; he argued that Justice Scalia was wrong in Mertens to assert that 
damages were always a legal remedy and explained that Scalia may have been 
confused because awards of compensatory relief in courts of equity were com-
monly called “surcharge” instead of “damages.” Langbein, supra note 15, at 
1352–53. However, Langbein never argues that the Court would accept sur-
charge as an ERISA remedy. Instead, he argues that surcharge is simply a 
synonym for damages. Id. If this were true, then as explained in Part II.A.1, 
the Court would reject surcharge as an ERISA remedy because allowing it 
would deprive the word “equitable” in ERISA of any limiting meaning. In con-
trast, this Note argues that surcharge is a distinctly equitable remedy, clearly 
distinguished from legal damages, and that therefore it meets the Court’s re-
quirements for an ERISA remedy. 
 18. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). 
 19. See id. § 1132(a)(3). 
 20. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204–21 (2004); see 
also id. at 222–24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 21. See id. at 222–24. 
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uum” exists in which plaintiffs like Ms. Cicio have little oppor-
tunity for relief.22  
A. REMEDIES PROVIDED BY ERISA 
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 in response to a widely 
publicized pension fund failure that left workers without funds 
for retirement.23 With ERISA, Congress created a comprehen-
sive scheme of federal regulation of employee pension plans, in-
tending to protect workers from the risk of default or misad-
ministration of their retirement plans.24 ERISA not only covers 
pension plans, but also all employee benefit plans including 
welfare benefit plans such as health insurance.25 
ERISA draws from the law of trusts and “treats anyone as 
a fiduciary to the extent that person exercises material discre-
tion over the [employee benefit] plan.”26 ERISA also requires 
that all such fiduciaries fulfill certain duties.27 Among its man-
dates, ERISA requires a fiduciary to “discharge his duties with 
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing 
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries . . . [and] defray-
ing reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”28 
A beneficiary may pursue three types of civil remedies for 
fiduciary violations of the Act’s requirements. First, a benefici-
ary may use an ERISA reimbursement action to sue to recover 
benefits due or to enforce or clarify his or her rights under the 
plan.29 This provision does not provide for compensating any 
harm the beneficiary may have incurred as a consequence of 
the benefit denial—it is limited to paying the benefits originally 
denied.30 Second, ERISA allows a suit for “appropriate relief” 
for breach of fiduciary duty.31 Third, a beneficiary may also sue 
 
 22. Id. at 222. 
 23. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 1321–22. 
 24. Id. at 1322. 
 25. James W. Kim, Note, Managed Care Liability, ERISA Preemption, 
and State ‘Right to Sue’ Legislation in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 36 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 651, 655 (2005). 
 26. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 1324–25. 
 27. See id.  
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000). 
 29. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109. 
ROBINSON_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:13:57 AM 
2006] EMBRACING EQUITY 1451 
 
to obtain “other appropriate equitable relief.”32 The Supreme 
Court could have construed the latter two remedies to allow 
compensation for harm suffered by beneficiaries like Ms. Cicio. 
Instead, in a series of decisions, the Court narrowly interpreted 
these two provisions to strictly limit remedies for individuals 
against the plan. 
B. LIMITS ON ERISA REMEDIES 
The Supreme Court has limited the ERISA provisions for 
appropriate relief for breach of fiduciary duty and for other ap-
propriate equitable relief through three decisions. In Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, the Court ruled 
that a suit for appropriate relief for breach of fiduciary duty 
under ERISA authorizes payment of damages for a breach of 
fiduciary duty only to the plan, not to the participant.33 Thus, a 
plaintiff like Ms. Cicio cannot receive any compensation as ap-
propriate relief under this provision. The Court also held that 
this provision did not authorize compensatory or punitive dam-
ages, characterizing those damages as “extracontractual.”34 
However, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that it 
might authorize such damages under a separate provision pro-
viding for other appropriate equitable relief.35 
Eight years later the Court appeared to foreclose this pos-
sibility in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.36 In Mertens, the plain-
tiffs sought compensation for the actions of a pension plan that 
resulted in beneficiaries receiving reduced benefits.37 The bene-
ficiaries sued under ERISA’s provision for other appropriate 
equitable relief.38 In writing for the 5–4 majority, Justice Scalia 
held that the relief sought was not available because equitable 
relief in the statute includes only relief “typically” available in 
courts of equity before the merger of courts of law and equity.39 
Scalia mentioned three categories of remedies that would qual-
ify as equitable relief: injunctions, mandamus, and restitu- 
 
 
 32. Id. § 1132(a)(3). 
 33. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985). 
 34. Id. at 144. 
 35. Id. at 139. 
 36. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
 37. Id. at 251. 
 38. Id. at 253. 
 39. Id. at 256. 
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tion.40 He specifically held that compensatory damages are not 
an equitable remedy.41 
Almost a decade later, the Court clarified its standard for 
equitable relief in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. 
Knudson.42 In Great-West, an insurer sought restitution for 
payments to a beneficiary after that beneficiary obtained a 
judgment against a third party.43 To determine what consti-
tutes equitable relief, Scalia, writing again for a 5–4 majority, 
examined the types of remedies available in courts of equity be-
fore the merger of equity and law.44 Under this revised test, the 
Court examined “standard current works such as Dobbs, 
Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements” to determine whether 
the requested relief was “typically available in equity.”45 Scalia 
found that an action for restitution was only equitable if the 
plaintiff sought money or property that could “clearly be traced 
to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.”46 
Thus, restitution that imposes liability is legal, while restitu-
tion that seeks to restore particular property is equitable.47 Im-
portantly, the Court limited this distinction to actions seeking 
restitution.48 
These three decisions have almost completely foreclosed 
compensatory relief for beneficiaries under ERISA. Russell pre-
cluded compensation for beneficiaries in suits for appropriate 
relief for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.49 Mertens and 
Great-West then excluded compensatory damages in suits for 
other appropriate equitable relief and limited such relief to 
categories of relief typically available in equity.50 
This unavailability of compensatory damages makes  
ERISA remedies “almost entirely illusory” for victims of wrong-
ful healthcare denials.51 The Court recommends that patients 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
 43. Id. at 208. 
 44. Id. at 212. 
 45. Id. at 217. 
 46. Id. at 213. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. Indeed, the Court distinguished Mertens, which involved an 
action for damages for breach of fiduciary duty, as opposed to restitution. Id. 
at 215. 
 49. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985). 
 50. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
 51. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 2003) 
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“pa[y] for the treatment themselves and then [seek] reim-
bursement through [an ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) reimbursement 
action], or [seek] a preliminary injunction.”52 But injunctive re-
lief is only practical if the patient can delay treatment until the 
resolution of the lawsuit. Reimbursement similarly provides no 
relief for patients like Mr. Cicio who forgo treatment that is too 
expensive to pay out-of-pocket. Even if a patient can wait for an 
injunction or pay the high price of treatment, without the pos-
sibility of contingency fees, the plaintiff would have to pay for 
the lawsuit.53 As one court remarked, “Enacted to safeguard 
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, ERISA has 
evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health insurers 
. . . and other managed care entities from potential liability for 
the consequences of their wrongful denial of health benefits.”54 
Thus, beneficiaries like Ms. Cicio are effectively without re-
lief from ERISA. In theory, this absence of federal remedies 
still would not bar a suit by Ms. Cicio under state statutes or 
the common law. Unfortunately, the Court has also cut off 
those avenues of relief. 
C. THE COURT ELIMINATED NON-ERISA REMEDIES 
In addition to limiting ERISA remedies, the Court ex-
panded ERISA’s preemptive force to preclude almost all other 
avenues for relief. This has resulted in what Justice Ginsburg 
has termed a “regulatory vacuum,”55 where “[v]irtually all state 
law remedies are preempted but very few federal substitutes 
are provided.”56 In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, a unanimous 
Court held that ERISA completely preempts state law actions 
brought to remedy the denial of benefits under ERISA health 
plans.57 Not only state patients’ rights statutes, such as the one 
relied upon by the Davila plaintiffs, but also common law ac-
tions including breach of contract, wrongful death, and mal-
 
(Becker, J., concurring). 
 52. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 211 (2004). 
 53. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 459 (Becker, J., concurring). Indeed, Becker ar-
gues that the current system provides strong financial incentives for health 
plans to cheat their customers with impunity. Id. 
 54. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D. Mass. 
1997). 
 55. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. (quoting DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 456 (Becker, J., concurring)). 
 57. Id. at 213–14 (majority opinion). 
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practice are now unavailable to injured plaintiffs.58 For in-
stance, Ms. Cicio could not sue her insurer for breaching its 
contract to pay for care for her husband; nor could she sue her 
insurer for breaching its common law duty of care in negligence 
or malpractice; nor could she sue under any state statute—
ERISA preempts all such remedies.59 
Ginsburg urged Congress to amend ERISA to fill this vac-
uum, but she also pointed to another possible approach to ob-
taining “make-whole” relief for beneficiaries.60 She suggested 
that since Mertens’s limitations on consequential damages dealt 
only with nonfiduciaries, ERISA, “as currently written and in-
terpreted,” might allow “‘make-whole’ relief against a breaching 
fiduciary in light of the general availability of such relief in eq-
uity at the time of the divided bench.”61 
Numerous courts and commentators echo Ginsburg’s call 
for congressional action to fill this “gaping wound” and provide 
some remedy for wrongful health insurance benefit denials.62  
 
 
 58. One judge notes that breach of contract predates the Magna Carta, 
has been strictly enforced by courts since then until preempted by ERISA, and 
is the “very bedrock of our notion of individual autonomy and property rights 
. . . . Our entire capitalist structure depends on it.” Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. 
Supp. at 52–53. 
 59. In contrast, ERISA does not preclude a medical malpractice claim 
against a medical provider, or a mixed treatment and coverage claim against a 
plan that employs a treating physician, but does preclude claims against in-
surers for benefit decisions. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000). 
 60. Davila, 542 U.S. at 223 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 27–28 n.13, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) 
(No. 02-1845), 2004 WL 121584). 
 62. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to the majority opinion as an “injury that the courts have done 
to ERISA [that] will not be healed until the Supreme Court reconsiders the 
existence of consequential damages under the statute, or Congress revisits the 
law to the same end”), vacated sub nom. Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 
933 (2004) (mem.); see, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 
453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring) (urging that “Congress and the Su-
preme Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA re-
gime”); Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 53 (“This case, thus, becomes yet an-
other illustration of the glaring need for Congress to amend ERISA to account 
for the changing realities of the modern health care system.”); Kim, supra note 
25, at 701–02 (calling for a federal Patients’ Bill of Rights in response to 
Davila); Linda Peeno et al., A Wrong Without a Remedy, TRIAL, Sept. 2005, at 
60, 67 (“After Davila, consumer advocates, health care analysts, and even fed-
eral judges are looking to Congress to correct the disparity of rights—either 
through elimination or overhaul of ERISA’s effects.”). 
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Many also call for the Supreme Court to overrule Mertens’s 
limitations on “appropriate equitable relief.”63 Indeed, many 
conclude the Court now limits monetary relief for wrongful 
healthcare denials to payment for benefits due.64 However, 
these commentators have ignored the possibility raised in 
Ginsburg’s Davila concurrence: these patients may be able to 
obtain meaningful relief without overruling previous Supreme 
Court precedent and without congressional action. 
II.  FINDING MAKE-WHOLE RELIEF IN THE VACUUM BY 
EMBRACING EQUITABLE REMEDIES AND CLAIMS 
The surcharge remedy, coupled with a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty, may offer relief under ERISA for some of the 
harm caused by the wrongful denial of medical care. The cur-
rent Supreme Court test for equitable relief under ERISA is 
satisfied only if the cause of action and the category of remedy 
were typically available in courts of equity. A plaintiff can meet 
both prongs of this test by requesting the remedy of surcharge 
for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Although surcharge may 
seem like an obsolete historical remedy, such a remedy is pre-
cisely what the Court requires in declaring that it intends to 
revive the “obsolete distinction” between equity and law.65 In-
deed, unlike other proposals for make-whole relief under  
ERISA, surcharge is clearly distinguished from historically le-
gal damages and gives the Court exactly what it demands: a 
remedy that undeniably conforms to the “ancient classification” 
of equitable relief.66 
A. THE TEST FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF IN ERISA 
The Supreme Court has defined two prongs of the test for 
equitable relief under ERISA. First, the plaintiffs must seek a 
remedy typically granted by courts of equity.67 Second, they 
must bring a claim that could have been brought in courts of  
 
 
 63. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 15, at 1364; DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453; 
Cicio, 321 F.3d at 106 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). 
 64. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 25, at 652–53 (claiming that relief now is 
limited to the cost of the health services denied); Peeno, supra note 62, at 62. 
 65. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 216–17 
(2002). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257 (1993). 
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equity.68 Monetary relief is still available as long as it satisfies 
the two prongs of this test. 
1. Mertens Requires a Historically Equitable Category of 
Remedy 
The Court laid out the “remedy” prong of its test in 
Mertens, holding that relief is only equitable for purposes of 
ERISA if it is one of the “categories of relief that were typically 
available in equity,” as distinguished from legal relief some-
times available in equitable actions.69 For instance, in Mertens, 
Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged that because 
ERISA is rooted in the law of trusts, equitable relief could 
mean all relief available for breach of trust in courts of equity.70 
However, he reasoned that such an interpretation must be 
wrong because it would rob the phrase “equitable relief” of any 
limiting meaning—allowing any type of relief.71 Instead, he de-
fined the phrase to refer to “categories of relief typically avail-
able in equity.”72 Thus, the focus of the Mertens test is on the 
category of remedy as distinguished from the type of claim. Just 
because a claim could have been brought in a court of equity 
does not make any relief granted for that claim equitable re-
lief.73 
In Great-West, Scalia reiterated this point in rejecting an 
argument that “the common law of trusts provides petitioners 
with equitable remedies that allow them to bring this action 
under [ERISA]” because “a trustee could bring a [similar suit in 
equity].”74 He cited Mertens to reemphasize that the category of 
remedy must be equitable, regardless of whether courts of eq-
uity would have entertained a similar action.75  
 
 68. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 
F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 69. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256. 
 70. Id. at 257. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 256. 
 73. Id. at 256–57. 
 74. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 219 
(2002). 
 75. Id. Professor Langbein argues that the Court’s limitations on equita-
ble relief adhere neither to the historical understanding of the term nor to 
Congress’s intent in using the term in ERISA. Langbein, supra note 15, at 
1328–31. He refers to Scalia’s argument as “internally incoherent.” Id. at 
1352. He argues that Congress intended to include the full range of trust 
remedies in ERISA. Id. at 1319, 1331. However, as explained in this Part, the 
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In order to prove that a remedy is historically equitable, 
plaintiffs must show that it is clearly distinguished from legal 
remedies. In Mertens, Scalia argued that the remedy requested 
by the petitioners, although characterized as equitable, was in 
reality nothing other than a claim for compensatory damages—
a legal, not equitable remedy.76 The dissent argued the term 
equitable relief still restricted the scope of remedies, even if it 
embraced compensatory relief, because it excluded punitive 
damages, which were unavailable in equity.77 Scalia responded 
that punitive damages were sometimes available in courts of 
equity. Thus, according to him, if courts defined “equitable re-
lief” as “all relief available in courts of equity,” that definition 
would include punitive damages and would not limit equitable 
relief at all.78 Therefore, in the Court’s scheme, only remedies 
which provide something less than legal damages are truly dis-
tinguished from legal damages and qualify as equitable. 
2. Great-West Requires a Typically Equitable Basis for the 
Claim 
The second prong of the test for equitable relief under  
ERISA examines the basis for the claim. In Great-West, Scalia 
emphasized that a remedy is only equitable for purposes of ER-
ISA if it is “commonly ordered in equity cases” and excludes 
remedies only “occasionally awarded in equity cases.”79 Gins-
burg’s dissent focuses only on the Mertens prong, characterizing 
the test as a question only of the “substance of the relief re-
quested.”80 In response, Scalia argues that it is not only a ques-
tion of the substance of the relief, but also the “basis for [the] 
claim” that is important.81 For example, Scalia explains that an 
equity court would never grant “an injunction against [a] fail-
ure to pay a simple indebtedness.”82 The sources he cites for 
 
standard in these cases is internally consistent if understood as examining 
both the category of remedy and the type of action to narrowly define the term 
“equitable remedy.” 
 76. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255. 
 77. Id. at 270 (White, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 259 n.7 (majority opinion). 
 79. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 
F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)) (first emphasis added). 
 80. Id. at 228 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 213 (majority opinion). 
 82. Id. at 216; see also id. at 210–11. 
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this proposition83 explain that a court of equity would not grant 
such an injunction because it would not have jurisdiction over 
the case.84 Thus the question is one of equitable jurisdiction 
over the case, rather than type of remedy. 
Although Great-West considered the type of claim, it did 
not abandon the test for an equitable category of remedy.85 The 
Court now requires both prongs for equitable relief under  
ERISA. As Scalia noted, this is similar to the test courts use to 
determine the meaning of “equitable” for purposes of the Sev-
enth Amendment’s right to jury trial “[i]n suits at common 
law,”86 as opposed to suits at equity.87 In such cases, the Su-
preme Court also applies a two-prong test: “First, we compare 
the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the 
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and 
equity . . . . Second, we examine the remedy sought and deter-
mine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”88 Indeed, in 
Great-West, Scalia affirmed that the inquiry for determining 
equitable relief under ERISA should be similar to that used in 
Seventh Amendment contexts.89 
3. Monetary Relief Not Precluded 
The Mertens Court held the relief claimed was not equita-
ble in part because “[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic 
form of legal relief.”90 The Court reiterated this point in Great-
West, stating that “[a]lmost invariably . . . suits seeking . . . to 
compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are 
suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally 
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for 
loss resulting from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.”91 
Many courts and commentators read this passage to preclude 
 
 83. Id. at 210–11. 
 84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 cmt. a (1981) (explain-
ing that the availability of equitable injunctive relief for failure to perform a 
contractual duty was historically viewed as a matter of jurisdiction, deter-
mined by the adequacy of legal damages). 
 85. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 219. 
 86. Id. at 217 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974)). 
 87. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987). 
 88. Id. at 417–18. 
 89. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217. 
 90. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993). 
 91. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210. 
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monetary claims from equitable relief under ERISA.92 
However, courts routinely award monetary relief under 
ERISA’s other appropriate equitable relief provision while 
avoiding characterizing such awards as “damages.” For in-
stance, plaintiffs commonly win past due monetary benefits 
under this section.93 Courts often award interest on those past 
due benefits94 and have sometimes awarded attorneys fees un-
der this same provision.95 As the Tenth Circuit reasons, “[a]fter 
all, any equitable relief, including those forms explicated by the 
Court as available under [this section], must involve the direct 
or indirect transfer of money.”96 Indeed, Mertens explicitly au-
thorizes monetary relief, at least in the form of restitution.97 
4. Equitable Relief under ERISA Is Not Limited to 
Injunctions, Mandamus, and Restitution 
In Mertens, Justice Scalia declares that equitable relief as 
used in ERISA refers to “those categories of relief that were 
typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, 
and restitution, but not compensatory damages).”98 From this, 
some have concluded the Court will only allow injunction, 
mandamus, and restitution as equitable relief.99 Professor 
 
 92. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 
2003) (declaring that Mertens limited relief to “injunctions, mandamus, and 
restitution, but not monetary damages”); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan of 
Kan. City, 999 F.2d 298, 304–05 (8th Cir. 1993) (excluding a claim for relief 
because it involves monetary relief); Hartman v. Wilkes-Barre Gen. Hosp., 237 
F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (interpreting Great-West to preclude any 
claims for “money due and owing”); Langbein, supra note 15, at 1350; Kelly M. 
Loud, Comment, ERISA Preemption and Patients’ Rights in the Wake of Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1039, 1067 (2005). 
 93. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health and Welfare 
Plan v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1125 (10th Cir. 2004); Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 
F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994), aff ’d, 516 U.S. 489 (1996). 
 94. See, e.g., Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 196 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (reaffirming that interest is available as an equitable remedy under 
§ 502(a)(3) after Great-West); Dunnigan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 
223, 253 (2d Cir. 2002); Clair v. Harris Trust & Savs. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 
498–99 (7th Cir. 1999); Fotta v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d 
209, 213 (3d Cir.1998). 
 95. See, e.g., Gorman v. Carpenters’ & Millwrights’ Health Benefit Trust 
Fund, 410 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 96. Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health and Welfare Plan, 393 
F.3d at 1125. 
 97. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 
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Langbein goes further, explaining that mandamus was not his-
torically equitable, that injunction is explicitly allowed in  
ERISA separately from equitable relief, and that Great-West al-
lows restitution only when there is a constructive trust. There-
fore, he concludes, the only equitable relief now allowed under 
ERISA is that available through a constructive trust.100 
However, the plain words of the Mertens opinion do not support 
this constrictive reading. If Scalia had meant to limit relief to 
only those three categories, he is unlikely to have authorized 
“categories of relief . . . such as injunction, mandamus, and res-
titution.”101 Indeed, lower courts have awarded other categories 
of relief since Great-West.102 
Thus, for a plaintiff like Ms. Cicio to receive compensation 
for the losses caused by the insurer, she must sue for equitable 
relief under ERISA because the Act preempts all other forms of 
relief and because other ERISA remedies do not offer compen-
satory relief. The Supreme Court will only accept her suit if the 
basis of her claim is historically equitable and if she requests a 
remedy that was typically available in courts of equity. She can 
request a monetary remedy, and her choice of remedy is not 
limited to injunction, mandamus and restitution. The key re-
maining issue is whether such a remedy, which can provide 
compensation for her loss, exists. 
B. OTHER PROPOSALS DO NOT MEET THE COURT’S DEFINITION 
OF EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Lower courts and commentators have proposed solutions 
for awarding relief for consequential harms under ERISA by 
characterizing the relief in equitable terms such as restitution, 
reinstatement, or make-whole equitable relief. As explained be-
 
2003) (declaring that Mertens limited relief to “injunctions, mandamus, and 
restitution, but not monetary damages”); Langbein, supra note 15, at 1351–53, 
1360. 
 100. Langbein, supra note 15, at 1360. Langbein uses this analysis to show 
the absurdity of the limitations the Court has placed on the definition of “equi-
table remedies,” and the likelihood that such limitations were not intended by 
Congress. Id. 
 101. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added). 
 102. See, e.g., Mathews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1186 (9th Cir. 
2004) (awarding make-whole relief as “reinstatement”); Dunnigan v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 223, 253 (2d Cir. 2002) (awarding interest as make-
whole equitable relief); Clair v. Harris Trust & Savs. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498–
99 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); Fotta v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d 
209, 213 (3d Cir. 1998) (same). 
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low, such solutions are unlikely to meet current Supreme Court 
requirements for equitable relief under ERISA because the 
Court demands that the relief be equitable in substance, not 
merely in name. In contrast, surcharge for breach of fiduciary 
duty is substantively distinct from legal damages and is the 
best chance for make-whole relief for beneficiaries harmed by 
ERISA plan violations. 
1. Restitution Fails the Category of Remedy Test in Suits for 
Wrongful Benefit Denial 
Some courts have granted relief beyond mere benefits due 
as restitution. For example, the Seventh Circuit has awarded 
restitution of medical costs as relief for breach of fiduciary duty 
against a health insurance plan that wrongfully denied cover-
age.103 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Howe v. Varity called it 
“equitable restitution” when it awarded reinstatement into a 
benefits plan and the payment of lost benefits.104 However, this 
theory of relief is unlikely to qualify as equitable relief under 
ERISA after Great-West because it does not satisfy the remedy 
prong of the test. Great-West held that restitution is not a his-
torically equitable category of relief unless “money or property 
identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could 
clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defen-
dant’s possession.”105 Therefore, awards of reinstatement into a 
benefit plan, costs incurred due to a breach of fiduciary duty, or 
even benefits foregone as the result of such a breach are not 
historically equitable restitution because they do not seek to re-
cover funds in the plan’s possession. The Second Circuit 
reached the same conclusion in determining that restitution of 
medical costs such as that awarded by the Seventh Circuit is 
not equitable relief in light of Great-West.106 
 
 103. Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, 226 F.3d 574, 592 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 104. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756–57 (8th Cir. 1994), aff 'd, 516 
U.S. 489 (1996). The Supreme Court affirmed Varity but did not discuss the 
remedies issue. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 495 (1996). 
 105. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 
(2002); see also David D. Leishman, Note, Adding Insult to Injury: ERISA, 
Knudson, and the Error of the Possession Theory, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1214, 
1231–32 (2005). 
 106. Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 339–40 (2d Cir. 2005). The Seventh 
Circuit in Bowerman relied partially on Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 
F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999). Bowerman, 226 F.3d at 592. Strom was abrogated by 
the Second Circuit in Pereira, because the Second Circuit recognized that res-
titution was only equitable after Great-West if it involved funds in the defen-
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The Tenth Circuit also applied this reasoning in refusing to 
award a plaintiff the benefits she lost because of an ERISA life 
insurance plan’s breach of duty.107 The court explained the 
beneficiary could claim restitution for the amounts she had 
paid in plan premiums, which would be directly traceable to 
her, but not for the insurance benefit she would have received 
absent the breach of duty.108 
In the case of a health insurance denial, a court is also 
likely to reject a claim for restitution of direct or consequential 
losses. Like the life insurance beneficiary, a health insurance 
beneficiary might seek benefits due under the plan. Even if the 
beneficiary paid for health care out-of-pocket, those payments 
would not be made to the plan, and so no funds possessed by 
the plan would be “directly traceable” to the beneficiary.109 
Courts have emphatically refused to grant restitution for prof-
its derived through unjust enrichment when a health plan 
wrongly denies a procedure.110 In a case like Ms. Cicio’s, where 
a plaintiff forgoes care and seeks compensation for losses 
caused by the health care denial, there is not even a monetary 
expenditure for health care by the plaintiff for which to claim 
restitution.111 
2. Reinstatement Fails the Category of Remedy Test 
Courts have attempted to circumvent Great-West’s appar-
ent foreclosure of restitution for benefit denials by recasting the 
same type of award as reinstatement. This theory is also 
unlikely to satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirements for equi-
table relief under ERISA. In Mathews v. Chevron Corp., plan 
administrators convinced the plaintiffs to forgo an opportunity 
to participate in a pension plan.112 The Ninth Circuit granted 
make-whole relief to the plaintiffs.113 The relief—all the bene-
fits the plaintiffs would have received had they enrolled in the 
 
dant’s possession. Pereira, 413 F.3d at 339–40. 
 107. Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of New York, 392 F.3d 401, 406 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213–14. 
 110. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Mathews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 113. Id. 
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plan from the start114—was identical to that granted in Var-
ity.115 But unlike in Varity, and perhaps in response to the limi-
tations on restitution after Great-West, the Ninth Circuit went 
to great lengths to characterize the relief as “reinstatement” 
and did not mention the term “restitution.”116 
Furthermore, although the Ninth Circuit in a series of 
cases cites the Supreme Court in Varity for the proposition that 
reinstatement is “equitable, not compensatory relief,”117 none of 
these cases cite any “standard current works”118 as required by 
the Great-West test.119 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit is incorrect 
to cite Varity for its assertion that such an award is equitable 
relief because this issue was not before the Supreme Court in 
Varity.120 The Supreme Court simply relied on the lower court’s 
remedy determination, which characterized the remedy as res-
titution, not as reinstatement.121 
Thus, reinstatement does not pass the first prong of the 
test for equitable relief. Furthermore, even if it were an equita-
ble remedy, it would be difficult to characterize make-whole re-
lief for medical benefit denials as reinstatement. Unlike the de-
fendants in Mathews and Varity, Ms. Cicio’s benefit plan did 
not disenroll her, so she cannot be reinstated to the plan. In-
deed, the Ninth Circuit explicitly distinguishes such claims 
from reinstatement.122 
3. Equitable Relief for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Fails the 
Category of Remedy Test 
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has argued that  
ERISA allows make-whole equitable relief for breach of fiduci-
ary duty, reasoning that any relief for breach of fiduciary duty 
 
 114. Id. at 1186. 
 115. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994), aff 'd, 516 U.S. 
489 (1996). 
 116. Mathews, 362 F.3d at 1186–87. 
 117. McLeod v. Or. Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 118. See Mathews, 362 F.3d at 1186–87; Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
150 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 1998); FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 
1261–62 (9th Cir. 1997); McLeod, 102 F.3d at 379. 
 119. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 
(2002). 
 120. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996). 
 121. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 756–57 (8th Cir. 1994), aff 'd, 516 
U.S. 489 (1996). 
 122. See Bast, 150 F.3d at 1011; Owens, 122 F.3d at 1261–62. 
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is inherently equitable.123 Although no courts have adopted the 
DOL’s approach to grant compensation for consequential losses, 
three Circuits have awarded interest on benefits paid after a 
delay that constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.124 Courts in 
these cases have justified paying interest as equitable relief be-
cause it “make[s] the plaintiff whole.”125 In Dunnigan v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance, the Second Circuit awarded interest on 
past due benefits, explicitly stating that make-whole relief is an 
appropriate equitable remedy for breach of fiduciary duty.126 In 
that case, the court did not characterize the interest as restitu-
tion but only referred to it as an “equitable make-whole rem-
edy” for the “unjust enrichment” of the defendants.127 
This argument ignores the remedy prong of the test for eq-
uitable relief. The DOL argued that this test does not apply to 
actions against fiduciaries because Mertens involved an action 
against nonfiduciaries.128 As the DOL notes, the Supreme 
Court initially stated the issue in Mertens as “whether a nonfi-
duciary who knowingly participates in the breach of a fiduciary 
duty imposed by . . . ERISA . . . is liable [to the plan] for . . . 
compensatory damages.”129 However, the Court based its hold-
ing not on the fiduciary status of the defendant but on the 
meaning of the term “equitable relief,” concluding that it ex-
cluded compensatory damages regardless of whether they were 
sought against a fiduciary or nonfiduciary.130 Furthermore, 
 
 123. See generally Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellants, Mathews v. 
Chevron, 362 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-15936 & 02-16209), 2002 WL 
32290814 [hereinafter Brief for the Secretary of Labor]. 
 124. See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 F.3d 223, 253 (2d Cir. 
2002); Clair v. Harris Trust & Savs. Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498–99 (7th Cir. 
1999); Fotta v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers, 165 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 125. Dunnigan, 277 F.3d at 229. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 9–10. 
 129. Id. at 9 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 249–50 
(1993)) (emphasis omitted). 
 130. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255–56; Langbein, supra note 15, at 1349–50. 
Langbein notes that “to the astonishment of the ERISA bar, the Supreme 
Court avoided deciding the question of nonfiduciary liability. The Court rested 
its decision on the ground that even if there were such liability, section 
502(a)(3) did not authorize the plaintiffs to recover consequential damages for 
Hewitt's conduct.” Id.; see also McLeod v. Or. Lithoprint Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 
378 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he status of the defendant, whether fiduciary or nonfi-
duciary, does not affect the question of whether damages constitute ‘appropri-
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while the DOL cites Mertens’s acknowledgment that “money 
damages were available in . . . courts [of equity] against the 
trustee,”131 it fails to note that the next passage repudiates the 
DOL’s reasoning and mandates a focus on the type of relief 
rather than the type of court.132 
Moreover, the DOL’s argument fails to meet the command 
to specify a particular category of relief that provides something 
less than “all relief.”133 Instead, it argues for a blanket accep-
tance of make-whole relief just because the type of action—
breach of fiduciary duty—was historically equitable.134 In 
Mertens, the Court rejected such a vague request for compensa-
tion as nothing other than a claim for compensatory damages—
a legal remedy.135 Because the DOL’s argument similarly re-
quests equitable relief without defining any limits on that re-
lief, Scalia is likely to reject that argument as allowing “any 
type of relief at all.” Indeed, Scalia has explicitly ruled out the 
DOL’s approach by rejecting any interpretation of equitable re-
lief which would allow “all relief available for breach of 
trust.”136 Thus, make-whole relief for breach of fiduciary duty, 
like restitution and reinstatement, fails as a remedy under the 
Supreme Court’s current ERISA jurisprudence. 
C. SURCHARGE FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY COMPENSATES 
VICTIMS OF HEALTH INSURANCE DENIALS AND SATISFIES THE 
SUPREME COURT’S REQUIREMENTS 
In light of the rejection of restitution, reinstatement, and 
make-whole relief as ERISA remedies, plaintiffs like Ms. Cicio 
may only find meaningful relief by embracing an ancient rem-
edy from courts of equity. Surcharge provides monetary com-
pensation for losses caused by a breach of fiduciary duty, and 
thus could offer such relief. Moreover, it is a historically 
 
ate equitable relief ’ . . . .” (quoting Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 30 
F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
 131. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 10 (quoting 
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256). 
 132. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 12. But cf. 
McLeod, 102 F.3d at 378 (“[T]he status of the defendant, whether fiduciary or 
nonfiduciary, does not affect the question of whether damages constitute ‘ap-
propriate equitable relief ’ . . . .” (quoting Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 
30 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
 135. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255. 
 136. Id. at 260. 
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equitable remedy, and breach of fiduciary duty is a historically 
equitable claim. Thus, surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty 
satisfies both prongs of the Supreme Court’s test for equitable 
relief under ERISA. 
1. Surcharge: A Historically Equitable Remedy 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines surcharge as “[t]he amount 
that a court may charge a fiduciary that has breached its 
duty.”137 Surcharge is levied on the trustee and paid directly to 
the beneficiary to compensate for loss.138 This historical remedy 
is the basis of the remedy still recognized by the Restatement of 
Trusts for breach of fiduciary duty, “which make[s] the breach-
ing trustee ‘chargeable with’ loss caused, profit made, or fore-
gone profit.”139 Interestingly, while the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts does not refer to the term “surcharge” directly, the new-
est revision has revived the term. The Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts explains: “If the breach of trust causes a loss, including 
any failure to realize income, capital gain, or appreciation that 
would have resulted from proper administration, the benefici-
aries may surcharge the trustee for the amount necessary to 
compensate fully for the consequences of the breach.”140 
Courts award surcharge not only for lost income or gain, 
but also for costs incurred by the beneficiary because of the 
breach of fiduciary duty, including attorney fees.141 Although 
surcharge has apparently never been claimed under ERISA, it 
has been granted for breach of fiduciary duty against bank-
ruptcy trustees,142 against partners interfering with the receiv-
ership of a partnership,143 and against trustees who have mis-
managed trust assets.144 Bankruptcy trustees, like ERISA 
benefit plans, are immune from actions by third parties arising 
in the scope of their official duties, except for actions for breach 
 
 137. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (8th ed. 2004). 
 138. See F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 
1128, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 139. Langbein, supra note 15, at 1353 n.208. 
 140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205, cmt. a (1992); see also id. 
§§ 210, 211. 
 141. See, e.g., F.J. Hanshaw Enters., 244 F.3d at 1142 (awarding costs in-
curred due to an attempted bribe of a court-appointed receiver, including at-
torney fees). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d 1, 7 
(1st Cir. 1999), cited in Langbein, supra note 15, at 1352 n.210. 
 143. See, e.g., F.J. Hanshaw Enters., 244 F.3d at 1142. 
 144. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951). 
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of fiduciary duty—so tort remedies are excluded but historical 
trust remedies are allowed.145 An award of monetary surcharge 
compensating a beneficiary for consequential loss is a common 
remedy for breach of fiduciary duty in these cases.146 
2. Surcharge for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Satisfies the Test 
for Equitable Relief Under ERISA 
The Supreme Court holds that to give meaning to the term 
“equitable” in ERISA, it is necessary to revive the “obsolete dis-
tinction” and “ancient classification” of equitable as distin-
guished from legal remedies.147 Thus, it should not be surpris-
ing that beneficiaries may only find meaningful relief under 
ERISA by invoking surcharge—an ancient, nearly obsolete 
remedy from the days of the divided bench. 
As previously discussed, the remedy prong of the equitable 
relief test requires a court to determine whether the “category 
of relief was typically available in equity”148 using “standard 
current works.”149 Surcharge was a historical trust law remedy, 
as described in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts.150 It is also 
cited with approval as a remedy for beneficiaries throughout 
Bogert’s treatise on trusts,151 and is referenced in Scott’s trea-
tise.152 
The Supreme Court is likely to consider Bogert’s treatise 
and Scott’s treatise authoritative “standard current works” for 
purposes of the Great-West test. In fact, Great-West used these 
same sources to interpret the scope of fiduciary duties under 
ERISA in Varity,153 and in Mertens, the Court used both 
sources to interpret ERISA in light of traditional trust law.154 
 
 145. See In re Mailman Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp., 196 F.3d at 7 n.4. 
 146. See, e.g., id.; Mosser, 341 U.S. at 272; F.J. Hanshaw Enters., 244 F.3d 
at 1142. 
 147. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 216–17 
(2002). 
 148. Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
 149. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217. 
 150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1992); see also id. 
§§ 210, 211. 
 151. See, e.g., GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 481 nn.34 & 82 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005), 
§ 541 nn.69 & 73 (rev. 2d ed. 1978), § 542 n.6 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2005). 
 152. 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 238–39 (4th ed. 1987). 
 153. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 502 (1996). 
 154. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254, 256 (1993). 
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Scalia’s opinions do not reference the Restatement of 
Trusts, instead referring to the Restatements of Restitution 
and of Contracts.155 However, the Court’s reliance on the law of 
trusts for interpretation of ERISA156 and Scalia’s explicit ap-
proval of the use of Restatements, makes it likely he would ap-
prove of reliance on the Restatement of Trusts.157 
Similarly, a trust-based remedy is appropriate for ERISA 
actions because the Supreme Court has acknowledged that  
ERISA encodes principles of trust law.158 Congress intended to 
define ERISA duties and remedies to mirror trust law duties 
and remedies.159 Indeed, Mertens bases its interpretation of 
ERISA on trust law,160 and Davila relies on trust law to define 
the scope of fiduciary duties.161 In Varity, the Supreme Court 
declared that the law of trusts was the starting point for inter-
preting ERISA, although it would also consider text and con-
gressional intent.162 In fact, in that case, the Court reached its 
holding solely by relying on the law of trusts because it found 
no compelling reason to deviate from those principles.163 
Although Justice Scalia disapproves of some trust-based 
remedies,164 his objections do not apply to surcharge. In Great-
West, Scalia criticizes a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) brief 
that analogizes the relief sought by the petitioner to one form of 
equitable relief defined in the Restatement of Trusts.165 The 
Restatement allows charging a beneficiary for amounts he or 
she contractually owed to the trust but failed to pay.166 How-
ever, the Restatement remedy cited by the DOJ does not re-
quire the beneficiary to pay the money owed; rather, it only al-
lows the trustee to collect the money due out of the 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust.167 As Scalia points out, this is 
 
 155. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211, 
213 (2002). 
 156. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110–11 (1989). 
 157. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217. 
 158. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 110–11. 
 159. Langbein, supra note 15, at 1324. 
 160. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993). 
 161. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004). 
 162. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1996). 
 163. Id. at 506. 
 164. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 219–20 
(2002). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 252, 255 (1959)). 
 167. Id. 
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in contrast to the relief sought in Great-West, where the peti-
tioners wanted the beneficiaries to refund amounts owed out of 
other funds not related to the trust.168 Because the equitable 
remedy in the Restatement was not truly analogous to the re-
lief sought by the plaintiffs, the Court refused to grant the re-
lief.169 
In contrast, surcharge is not merely analogous to, but is 
the exact type of relief sought by beneficiaries harmed by 
health care denials. Surcharge makes the fiduciary liable for 
any “loss, including any failure to realize income, capital gain, 
or appreciation that would have resulted from proper admini-
stration,” and authorizes “the amount necessary to compensate 
fully for the consequences of the breach.”170 Indeed, in cases of 
negligent or willful harm, the fiduciary may be personally li-
able to the beneficiary.171 
Unlike a simple request for equitable relief to compensate 
for loss, which Scalia characterized as “nothing other than 
compensatory damages,”172 surcharge has substantive differ-
ences from damages. Surcharge provides only compensation for 
financial loss,173 requires proof of a precise amount of loss,174 
and generally requires bad faith.175 In contrast, tort damages 
have a much larger scope—they often compensate for nonpecu-
niary losses.176 Also, the measure of tort damages is not based 
on a precise accounting for loss like surcharge, but is based on 
a fact finder’s reasonable estimation of what amount will com-
pensate the plaintiff.177 Courts also award tort damages with- 
 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205, cmt. a. (1992); see also id. 
§§ 210, 211. 
 171. See In re Cochise Coll. Park, Inc. 703 F.2d 1339, 1357–58 n.26 (9th 
Cir. 1983); In re E Z Feed Cube Co., 115 B.R. 684, 689 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990). 
 172. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993). 
 173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a. 
 174. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 612–13 (2d Cir. 
1955). 
 175. See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 407–08 (1987) (refusing to grant sur-
charge against a parent/custodian who misused his child’s funds absent a 
showing of bad faith); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. g (1959) 
(explaining that a court in equity may refuse to grant surcharge when there is 
no evidence of bad faith). 
 176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979) (stating that damages 
may be rewarded for bodily harm and emotional distress). 
 177. Id. § 912 cmt. a. 
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out a showing of bad faith. Thus, surcharge has more in com-
mon with equitable restitution, which Scalia approves as an 
equitable remedy, than with damages.178 
Scalia distinguishes equitable restitution from legal resti-
tution because equitable restitution deals with a specific sum or 
property transferred from the plaintiff to the defendant.179 Like 
equitable restitution—and unlike damages—surcharge is based 
on an exact accounting of the financial losses incurred by the 
plaintiff.180 Moreover, both remedies require a finding of un-
fairness: equitable restitution requires unjust enrichment181 
and surcharge requires bad faith misadministration.182 
The fact that surcharge provides limited rather than all re-
lief is key to its acceptance as an equitable remedy. In Mertens, 
Justice Scalia rejected the proposed remedy, in part, because it 
was not limited to something less than legal damages and thus 
robbed the adjective “equitable” of any meaning in the phrase 
“equitable relief.”183 In contrast, because surcharge is limited to 
direct financial losses incurred by the plaintiffs, this remedy 
distinguishes equitable relief from all relief. It excludes dam-
ages for nonepecuniary losses and losses incurred without bad 
faith as well as punitive damages. 
The claim prong of the test for equitable relief asks 
whether the claim was historically available in equity. Relief 
for breach of fiduciary duty was not only typically, but exclu-
sively, available in courts of equity.184 The Dobbs treatise cited  
 
 
 
 178. Professor Langbein briefly mentions surcharge and describes it as pre-
cisely equivalent to legal damages. See Langbein, supra note 15, at 1352–53. 
However, as explained in this section, there are important differences between 
surcharge and damages. 
 179. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 
(2002). 
 180. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 612–13 (2d Cir. 
1955). 
 181. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 229 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 182. See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 407–08 (1987) (refusing to grant sur-
charge against a parent/custodian who misused his child’s funds, absent a 
showing of bad faith); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. g (1959) 
(explaining that a court in equity may refuse to grant surcharge when there is 
no evidence of bad faith). 
 183. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 259 n.7 (1993). For a dis-
cussion on this distinction, see infra Part II.A.1. 
 184. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 2. 
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by Scalia185 confirms that trust and fiduciary cases are histori-
cally and substantively equitable.186 In actions for breach of fi-
duciary duty, the Restatement explains that the law of trusts 
“required the fiduciary to restore the beneficiary to ‘the position 
in which he would have been if the trustee had not committed 
the breach of trust.’”187 Furthermore, the Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts specifically recommends the historically equitable 
remedy of surcharge for this exclusively equitable action.188 
Unlike the relief rejected by Scalia, surcharge for breach of 
fiduciary duty is based on the law of equity. In Great-West, 
Scalia argues that an injunction to pay money due on a contract 
is not equitable relief because it derives from principles of con-
tract law, which was in the domain of courts of law, not courts 
of equity.189 In contrast, surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty 
is equitable relief because the fiduciary duty derives from prin-
ciples of equity.190 
Finally, courts have determined that surcharge for breach 
of fiduciary duty is equitable relief for purposes of the right to a 
jury trial. In In re E Z Feed Cube Co.,191 the Bankruptcy Court 
applied the Supreme Court’s two-part test to deny a jury trial 
because the nature of the claim and the type of relief were both 
historically equitable.192 In contrast, where the remedy for 
breach of fiduciary duty was characterized merely as money 
damages, the court granted a jury trial because the type of re-
lief was legal.193 
Surcharge for breach of fiduciary duty passes the Supreme 
Court test for equitable relief under ERISA, because surcharge 
is a historically equitable category of remedy and because 
breach of fiduciary duty is a historically equitable claim. How-
ever, the question remains whether such a remedy would pro-
vide effective relief to plaintiffs like Ms. Cicio. 
 
 185. See, e.g., Great-West, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1 (citing 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW 
OF REMEDIES § 1.2, at 11 (2d ed. 1993)). 
 186. DOBBS, supra note 185, §2.6(3), at 163. 
 187. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 123, at 12 (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a, at 458). 
 188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1992). 
 189. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213. 
 190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a; Langbein, supra 
note 15, at 1352–53 (citing 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205, at 238–39 (4th ed. 1987)). 
 191. 115 B.R. 684 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990). 
 192. Id. at 689. 
 193. See Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 340–41 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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3. Surcharge for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Would Compensate 
Victims of Wrongful Health Insurance Denials 
Wrongful health insurance denials can constitute a breach 
of fiduciary duty actionable under ERISA. ERISA defines a fi-
duciary to include anyone who “exercises any discretionary au-
thority or discretionary control” over the plan’s “management,” 
“administration,” or “assets.”194 When a health insurer decides 
what is medically appropriate treatment for a beneficiary, that 
professional owes a fiduciary duty not to put the financial in-
terests of the health insurance company over the best interests 
of the plan beneficiary.195 In Davila, the Court held that a 
medical insurance company in an ERISA plan is a fiduciary, 
and the act of the company’s employee in denying benefits is a 
fiduciary act.196 Indeed, courts routinely recognize that a 
wrongful denial of health care benefits by an ERISA health in-
surance plan may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty for 
which there is relief under ERISA’s other appropriate equitable 
relief provision.197  
Surcharge is an appropriate remedy for the type of breach 
represented by wrongful health insurance denials. Wrongful 
insurance denials are closely analogous to other claims for 
which surcharge is granted, such as a misadministration of 
trust funds. Both claims are based on a breach of trust by a fi-
duciary. Like a trust fund administrator, ERISA plans are re-
quired to administer the plan solely in the interest of benefici-
aries.198 A misadministration of trust funds is actionable 
because it results in lost income and costs to beneficiaries. 
Similarly, a misadministration of an ERISA healthcare plan 
 
 194. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000) (defining “fiduciary”). 
 195. See Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1996); see 
also Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. Vytra 
Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (mem.). Furthermore, in this situa-
tion, the court need not apply the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard 
that applies to most ERISA plan discretionary decisions, but may require an 
“objectively reasonable” interpretation of plan terms such as “medical neces-
sity.” See Bynum v. Cigna Healthcare of N.C., Inc., 287 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 
2002). In some cases, this principle has even led courts to construe ambiguity 
in a plan term against the insurance company. See Bailey v. Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53, 57 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 196. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 219 (2004) (citing 2A supra 
note 190, §§ 182, 183; GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, 
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 541 (rev. 2d ed. 1993)). 
 197. See, e.g., Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, 226 F.3d 574, 590–92 (7th 
Cir. 2000); Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 154. 
 198. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000). 
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can result in lost income and costs to repair the damage. In 
both cases, such losses may be payable as surcharge. 
Although surcharge cannot compensate for nonpecuniary 
losses, it would provide effective compensation for financial 
losses incurred because of wrongful healthcare denials. Sur-
charge compensates the beneficiary of a trust for any financial 
loss, “including any failure to realize income, capital gain, or 
appreciation that would have resulted from proper administra-
tion,” caused by a breach of the fiduciary’s duty.199 A court will 
grant surcharge only where the plaintiffs make a precise ac-
counting of the financial loss.200 Some courts also require a 
showing of bad faith.201 In a case like Ms. Cicio’s, she could 
prove direct costs for intensive medical care and for the funeral. 
She might also prove lost income. Because surcharge compen-
sates only financial losses, she would not be able to receive 
compensation for loss of consortium, emotional distress, or pu-
nitive damages. Ms. Cicio might also be able to prove bad faith 
because of the insurer’s almost automatic denial of benefits and 
disregard for the prevailing standard of care.202 Moreover, the 
insurer had a profit interest in the decision to deny care. Al-
though such an interest always exists, the plan cannot base 
benefit decisions on a profit interest which is adverse to a bene-
ficiary’s interest.203 If Ms. Cicio can show the insurer likely 
acted on such an adverse interest, that would imply the insurer 
made its admittedly incorrect medical decision in bad faith.204 
Thus, surcharge would provide a meaningful remedy for her 
under ERISA.  
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has painted victims of wrongful 
healthcare denials into a corner, cutting off remedies available 
 
 199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a (1992); see also id. 
§§ 210, 211. 
 200. See Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 612–13 (2d Cir. 
1955). 
 201. See Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 407–08 (1987); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. g (1992). 
 202. See Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. 
Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 542 U.S. 933 (2004) (mem.). 
 203. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. 
 204. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951) (finding that will-
fully setting up an interest adverse to the interests of the trust beneficiaries, 
which is then acted on, is sufficient to support an award of surcharge even 
when the beneficiaries have incurred no loss). 
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under ERISA while construing ERISA to preempt all other 
remedies. In doing so, the Court has left these patients with no 
compensation for their loss. Most commentators have concluded 
that the only way out of this corner is for the Court to erase its 
precedents or for Congress to rewrite the statute. 
Lower courts have fashioned remedies that provide some 
compensation to these patients. Unfortunately, as this Note 
demonstrates, those solutions are unlikely to meet the current 
Supreme Court test for ERISA equitable relief. That test re-
quires both a historically equitable claim and a historically eq-
uitable remedy that is clearly distinguished from legal reme-
dies. 
However, by embracing the Court’s revival of the ancient 
classification between law and equity, plaintiffs can find appro-
priate ancient remedies that fulfill the Court’s requirements. 
Surcharge, the historically equitable remedy for breach of fidu-
ciary duty, meets the tests for equitable relief under ERISA 
and is substantively distinguished from legal damages. Most 
importantly, it offers a chance at compensation for victims of 
wrongful health insurance denials. 
